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Within the conservative intellectual renascence that took place in the United 
States following World War II, there emerged several distinct schools of thought. 
George Nash classifies the three principal groups that ultimately emerged as 
traditionalists, libertarians, and anti-Communists; and while this tripartite divi-
sion conceals significant disagreements within each group, and implies a certain 
rigidity of categorization that did not really exist (to which group would one 
assign William F. Buckley, Jr., for example?), it is more than adequate for our 
purposes.1 Of these groups, it is the traditionalists—so named in order to 
distinguish them from their (arguably more numerous) libertarian counterparts, 
as well as to identify them with the modest Burkean revival that took place during 
the 1950s—to which I turn my attention in this paper. Broadly speaking, 
traditionalists believed in prescription over rash innovation, emphasized the 
importance of private property and social distinctions, and denied the perfectibil-
ity of man. They viewed man and his condition in the concrete, and not with 
reference to an imaginary state of nature or under a Rawlsian veil of ignorance.2 
Russell Kirk, while offering six "canons of conservative thought," insisted that 
conservatism was less an ideology than a temper of mind.3 
In their work traditionalists often reflected on the kind of social and political 
order that would most conduce political freedom and social order. In so doing, 
they inevitably discussed the importance of protecting the intermediary institu-
tions that stood between the individual and the state. Tocqueville had identified 
them as a key bulwark of American liberty; and the traditionalists sought to ensure 
their vitality whether their antagonist be the central state or the modern corpora-
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tion. For Americans who reflexively identify the right with market economics 
and laissez faire, the traditionalist perspective will come as a surprise; but it was 
advanced by some of the most accomplished conservative intellectuals of the 
postwar period. 
Traditionalist political and social thought focused primarily on preserving 
what Edmond Burke called the "little platoons" of civilization, all those associa-
tions—e.g., family, church, town, civic group—that gave people social identities 
and prevented them from dissolving into an undifferentiated mass. It is funda-
mental to conservatism to prefer the local and particular to the abstract and 
universal,4 and in advocating the pre-modern idea of a federative polity composed 
of a variety of little sovereignties, they hoped to substitute for the superficial and 
abstract sense of identity manufactured by the modern unitary state the true 
identity and rootedness that comes from belonging to small and well-defined 
associations. In The Conservative Mind, Kirk concluded that without this "spirit 
of particularism, the idea of local associations and local rights, perhaps no sort of 
conservatism is practicable."5 Dedicated to this principle, these traditionalist 
conservatives consistently fought the leveling forces, whether federal edicts or 
business combinations, that threatened to dissolve the organic network of 
interpersonal relationships that comprised a community. 
Three of the most influential and representative of the traditionalists were 
Russell Kirk, Richard Weaver, and Robert Nisbet. Kirk, conservative historian, 
philosopher, and critic, is frequently called the father of the conservative 
movement, and certainly of its traditionalist wing. His seminal Conservative 
Mind (1953), along with his founding of Modern Age—which became the 
principal academic journal of the intellectual right—established him as one of 
America's top conservative thinkers. Over the next four decades he would write 
thirty books and hundreds of articles, advancing the conservative intellectual 
movement he had done so much to construct. Richard Weaver, while not as 
prolific as Kirk, contributed enduring works on history, rhetoric, and philosophy 
while a professor of literature at the University of Chicago.6 Robert Nisbet, a 
Columbia University sociologist, made important scholarly contributions to his 
own discipline, but after publishing his book The Quest for Community (1953), 
soon found himself drafted into a traditionalist movement that sensed in his work 
the mind of a kindred spirit.7 It is primarily through the work of these men that 
I shall examine the school of thought that for lack of a better term I have called 
"conservative communitarianism." 
To resurrect the communitarian work of these men is far from a sterile 
intellectual exercise. Nothing could be clearer than the continuing relevance of 
the issues the traditionalists confronted. In recent years it has been primarily left-
leaning communitarians who have engaged issues of community, liberty, and 
individualism most vigorously and thoughtfully; nearly forgotten is that the 
traditionalists, or conservative communitarians, had distinct insights of their own 
in these areas. An appreciation of the traditionalist perspective, moreover, 
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provides insight into the internecine conflicts that consume conservatives in our 
own day. 
Traditionalists based their attachment to community life, they insisted, not 
on mere sentiment or nostalgia, but on serious reflections on history and human 
nature. Richard Weaver's study of American social thought, for example, 
uncovered "two types of American individualism": the "social bond individual-
ism" of John Randolph of Roanoke, and the isolationist and atomistic variety 
practiced by Henry David Thoreau and many of his fellow Transcendentalists.8 
Thoreau's penchant for abstract speculation in political matters was certain to 
elicit the censure of the traditionalist, but it was his commitment to a theoretically 
absolute individualism, divorced from the practical necessities of governance and 
order, that particularly concerned Weaver. When Thoreau refused to pay the 
church levy, for example, he declared that he did not "wish to be regarded as a 
member of any incorporated society which I have not joined." The Concord sage 
was unclear as to whether his categorical rejection of all such associations 
included the very government under whose authority he was born, but Weaver 
was no doubt correct to observe that his argument pointed in this direction. By 
making all decisions bearing on authority and submission subject to the sovereign 
will of the individual, whose subjective whim the legislator may never legiti-
mately override, Thoreau had made any stable political order utterly impossible.9 
The individualism of John Randolph, according to Weaver, recognizes the 
absurdity of theories which have as their starting point such an abstraction as the 
sovereign individual, divorced from all social relationships and independent of all 
other persons and institutions. Randolph acknowledges with Aristotle that man 
is a political animal, and that it is only through his interaction and relationships 
with other people and through his membership in society that he becomes truly 
human. His defense of states' rights, while on the one hand a repudiation of 
arbitrary central authority, explicitly recognizes the individual's status as a 
member of a coiporate body.10 
Central to the traditionalist's view of human nature, therefore, was the 
insistence that the fundamental unit of society was not the individual but the 
group, that it is only within a social context that the goods of human excellence 
can be cultivated.11 To set men free from the various social identities that have 
defined them, traditionalists insist, is not to liberate them but to reduce them to 
mere masses.12 As Robert Nisbet explains, "What is crucial in the formation of 
the masses, is the atomization of all social and cultural relationships within which 
human beings gain their normal sense of membership in society. The mass is an 
aggregate of individuals who are insecure, basically lonely, and ground down, 
either through decree or historical circumstance, into mere particles of social 
dust." 
The body politic enters the terminal phase when what had once been a people, 
with all its distinctions, little sovereignties, and individuating characteristics, is 
reduced to a mere mass. The would-be totalitarian is well aware indeed of the 
individual's need for social identity; and in place of the sense of community that 
Defending the "Little Platoons" 131 
Figure 3: Robert Nisbet. Courtesy Columbia University Press Office. 
132 Thomas E. Woods, Jr. 
the masses once found in religion, in the family, in small political communities, 
and in professional or workingmen's associations, he is prepared to offer them 
membership in a great national community and a share in great collective 
enterprises. When masses exist in any substantial number, Nisbet argued, 
half the work of the totalitarian leader has been done for him. 
What remains but to complete, where necessary, the work of 
history, and to grind down into atomic particles all remaining 
evidences of association and social authority? What remains, 
then, but to rescue the masses from their loneliness, their 
hopelessness and despair, by leading them into the Promised 
Land of the absolute, redemptive State?13 
Nisbet appealed to recent findings in a variety of disciplines to support his 
contentions about human nature. Most obviously, perhaps, was the work of 
Durkheim, which found that the highest rates of suicide and insanity obtained 
where individualism, both moral and social, was greatest. In the fields of 
psychiatry and social psychology, Nisbet pointed to such psychiatrists as Karen 
Horney, Erich Fromm, and Harry Stack Sullivan. When Sigmund Freud began 
his groundbreaking work in clinical psychology, the fundamental stability of 
society was assumed; these scholars, on the other hand, were pointing to the 
increasingly individualistic and impersonal society in which people lived for the 
source of their neuroses.14 The conclusion to be drawn from this a posteriori 
evidence was simple and straightforward: there was something distinctly unnatu-
ral about modern political and social arrangements. 
Traditionalists therefore insisted that society be viewed not as a mere 
aggregation of individuals but as a delicate edifice consisting of numerous 
geographic communities, each with rights and traditions of its own. Often citing 
Calhoun, they found the roots of tyranny in the exaltation of the central state at 
the expense of these smaller communities, and in the refusal to recognize 
competing jurisdictions within the larger national framework. "The totalitarian 
philosophy," according to Weaver, "assumes that the unit of the whole, or the 
totality, has all the rights and that the constituent parts either have no rights or have 
rights of an inferior order."15 
In their defense of the integrity of these "constituent parts," they made a clear 
distinction between traditional American democracy, rooted in localism, and the 
centralized democracy of the French Jacobins, a system of government which 
elevated "simple majority rule to the status of divine right."16 Under the French 
system, Weaver explained, "structure was sacrificed to a political unity of an 
extremely unrelenting kind"; local prerogatives and loyalties were overridden by 
a cold "general will."17 
The problem with "Jacobin democracy," as the traditionalists saw it, was not 
simply that it hesitated to accept limits on the power and scope of the decisions 
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reached by a majority, or that it was easily manipulated by the unscrupulous 
demagogue. More precisely, it blurred the distinction between community and 
collectivism. These two principles of political organization "are at opposite 
poles," Kirk explained. "Community is the product of volition; collectivism, of 
compulsion."18 The problem with collectivism was not, as the libertarians would 
have it, that it conceived of man as part of a community; for indeed he was. The 
problem was that it proposed for his allegiance a large-scale, artificial community 
instead of the small, tangible ones of which he was more immediately a member.19 
In place of genuine local self-government, Jacobin absolutism substituted the 
sovereign will of the nation as a whole—that arbitrary despot whom Randolph 
derided as "King Numbers." By failing to acknowledge the rights and autonomy 
of the little sovereignties of which the nation is composed, the Jacobin under-
mined the vitality of community life and transformed historic communities into 
mere administrative units of the central state. 
The decentralized republic of small democratic communities that the tradi-
tionalists advocated does more than give meaning to the idea of local self-
government; it also contributes to the preservation of the free society. The 
existence of myriad autonomous political communities, they agreed, serves to 
frustrate the would-be reformer who seeks to impose a uniform General Will upon 
the nation as a whole. A unitary state may originate in the name of freedom, 
Weaver explained, "but once it has been made monopolistic and unassailable, it 
will, if history teaches anything, be used for other purposes."20 The discerning 
student of history and indeed of human nature sees the advantages of a society 
"which permits and even encourages many different centers of authority, influ-
ence, opinion, taste, and accomplishment. These things grow out of associations 
freely entered into by persons of common necessity, interest, or geographical 
habitat."21 Traditionalists thus agreed with Calhoun's classification of simple 
majoritarian democracy as simply another form of absolutism,22 and concluded 
that a state that wishes to remain free will honor local prerogatives and respect the 
diversity of customs and traditions that exist within its boundaries. 
Industrialization, traditionalists charged, had had devastating consequences 
for the local culture and traditional social relationships that made community life 
possible. Its effects on the traditional loci of community authority were particu-
larly severe; "[p]ersonal loyalties gave way to financial relationships," Kirk 
explained.23 The shop-owner, for example, the man of property who had provided 
community leadership and sometimes even largesse, was replaced by the branch 
manager of the chain store. The owner was now "hydra-headed, an impersonal 
corporation." No doubt some members of the corporation are men of refinement 
and goodwill, but their job calls for the maximization of profit, not an acute 
concern over the effects of their policies "upon the stability and beauty of a 
community."24 
Traditionalists were concerned that the increasingly large scale on which 
economic activity was being carried out would not merely disrupt community 
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relationships, but also would completely eclipse competing power centers and 
sources of authority. They feared economic concentration for the same reason 
they opposed the concentration of power in the federal government. "Collectiv-
ism is not the less disagreeable because it retains the label 'capitalism,'" Kirk 
observed.25 Taking his place alongside many of his predecessors in the Southern 
conservative tradition, Weaver expressed a similar distrust of laissez-faire and 
the economic concentration to which he thought it led.26 "[W]hen properties are 
vast and integrated, on a scale now frequently seen," he maintained, "it requires 
but a slight step to transfer them to state control."27 
Both men were unmoved by the libertarian distinction between the coercive 
authority of the state and the more precarious economic power of the corporation 
(contingent as it is upon the favorable disposition of consumers toward its 
product). "As the consolidation of economic power progresses," wrote Kirk, "the 
realm of personal freedom will diminish, whether the masters of the economy are 
state servants or the servants of private corporations."28 Kirk accepted uncritically 
the predictions of Karl Marx regarding the allegedly inevitable concentration and 
centralization of industry under capitalism: 
Karl Marx prophesied that private enterprise would become 
increasingly monopolistic, until only a few great "capitalist" 
corporations would remain; and then the triumph of Commu-
nist revolutionaries would be easy; for the men of property who 
once held stubbornly to their own would have given way to 
mere managers, without courage or interest to defend "capital-
ism"; and "capitalistic" managers can be supplanted by com-
missars overnight.29 
Kirk and Weaver in particular regretted capitalism's emphasis on physical 
mobility and its tendency to divorce man from his traditional attachment to his 
physical surroundings. Critical to capitalism and free enterprise is the unfettered 
movement of labor and capital across political boundaries, whether town, city, or 
state, and this economic dynamism can create severe dislocations in the life of a 
neighborhood. Moreover, the mass-production techniques which capitalism had 
introduced contributed to this revolution in personal mobility by making avail-
able on a large scale the very means of transportation that the laissez-faire order 
demanded. Thanks to the ready availability of the automobile to Americans, the 
1920s marked the climactic culmination of a transportation revolution that had 
proceeded relentlessly onward for a century. 
Kirk and Weaver accepted that this enormous increase in reliable and readily 
available transportation yielded benefits of profound significance. But Weaver 
feared that his newfound mobility threatened to sever the crucial link between 
man and his physical location that had served for centuries as a source of identity 
and stability for individuals and families. In his Visions of Order, Weaver 
observed: 
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Modern man has acquired an excessive mobility, so that it 
means nothing, as compared with yesterday, for him to be in 
one place or to go to another. The automobile and the airplane 
whirl him about with such velocity that it now has little 
significance to be in or from a place: one's situation can soon 
be altered. In the book of modern progress this is, it hardly 
needs saying, listed as a credit, yet there is much to make us feel 
that it is a debit when all things are considered. There is 
something protective about "place"; it means isolation, pri-
vacy, and finally identity.30 
In light of Weaver's quaint but compelling observation, it becomes easier to 
understand Russell Kirk's frequent characterization of the automobile as a 
"mechanical Jacobin." Since the first decade of the twentieth century, mass 
production of automobiles has proceeded to "disintegrate and stamp anew the 
pattern of communication, manners, and city life" in the United States, Kirk 
explained. Henry Ford attempted to reconcile the old rural order with urban life, 
by such means as "the restoration of little water-powered mills in small towns, and 
the allocation of garden plots to his employees—projects designed to check the 
proletarizing of society." Such efforts were abandoned at Ford's death, and the 
Ford Foundation "has been conducted upon the principles of 'disintegrated 
liberalism,' with little of the sound, if eccentric, common sense of its founder."31 
So concerned was Kirk over the disintegrative effects of market pressures 
that he was even prepared to offer a qualified endorsement of labor unions. He 
saw in union activity a desperate attempt on the part of workers to recapture the 
sense of community that he thought the market had taken from them. Kirk was 
confident that many of the very workers who struck for higher wages "would 
strike for lower wages just as cheerfully, if the union told them to. For the union 
has restored to them some semblance of community, which any true human being 
loves a great deal more than an abstract standard of living."32 He never counted 
himself among its supporters, but insofar as the labor union originated in social 
boredom and the dissolution of community ties he could not bring himself to 
condemn it, either.33 
Disturbed by the rootlessness that a variety of economic pressures appeared 
to be promoting, and seeing in this rootlessness a crucial ingredient in the rise of 
the mass man that they both deplored, Kirk and Weaver especially sympathized 
with the sentimental attachment to localism—and, no doubt, to the jeremiads 
against the "cash nexus"—they found in the antebellum conservative tradition of 
the American South.34 The South of John Randolph, Weaver argued, possessed 
a "rooted culture which viewed with dismay the anonymity and the social 
indifference of urban man."35 Weaver described the Old South as "a type of 
corporative society, held together by sentiments which do not survive a money 
economy," and went so far as to claim, in contradistinction to the materialistic 
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capitalism of the American North, that the antebellum South represented ''the last 
non-materialist civilization in the Western World"2,6 Although Weaver was 
sympathetic toward Abraham Lincoln, he sensed that a great deal was lost in the 
defeat of the South. By the 1860s, everything "betokened the breaking-up of the 
old synthesis in a general movement toward abstractions in human relationships." 
Political, economic, and intellectual trends seemed to point toward a political 
economy that would place much less emphasis on the various intermediary 
institutions and dispersed loci of authority which stood between the individual 
and the state. Weaver did not consider a political economy in which the individual 
stands naked before the central state, and risks becoming a mere "unit in the 
formless democratic mass," to be self-evidently preferable to the hierarchical 
structure of authority of a society such as that of the Old South.37 
In his own work on Southern political and intellectual history, Kirk discov-
ered the same stubborn attachment to the locality, a sentiment that protected men 
from a stultifying social anonymity.38 In standing against centralization, he 
wrote, "the South—alone among the civilized communities of the nineteenth 
century—had hardihood sufficient for an appeal to arms against the iron new 
order which, a vague instinct whispered to Southerners, was inimical to the sort 
of humanity they knew."39 Both Kirk and Weaver agreed with G.K. Chesterton 
that the true patriot never boasts of how large his country is, but "always, and of 
necessity, of how small it is." 
Implicit (and only seldom explicit) in the traditionalist critique was an ideal 
political economy that would recapture the sense of community that they believed 
a cold and relentless "modernization" had undermined. For Weaver, the "moral 
solution" to the specter of the mass man, to economic and political centralization, 
was "the distributive ownership of small properties." These properties would 
"take the form of independent farms, of local businesses, of homes owned by the 
occupants, where individual responsibility gives significance to prerogative over 
property."40 The connection between Weaver's vision and that of such distributists 
as Hilaire Belloc and G.K. Chesterton is very clear. 
Kirk, while not as explicit a distributist as Weaver, expressed sympathy for 
distributism in The Conservative Mind and indicated elsewhere a willingness to 
consider its program.41 His obvious displeasure at the dislocations occasioned by 
industrialism has been discussed above; on one occasion he revealingly lamented 
that "once in an industrial society, we cannot get out of it without starving half the 
world's population."42 
In addition, Kirk deplored the aesthetic effects of the forces of moderniza-
tion, particularly in Europe. All over the continent can be found examples of 
civilizational treasures blithely destroyed by what Kirk called "the evangels of 
Progress."43 As for the business class that made this transformation possible, Kirk 
had only contempt for their pretensions to moral and cultural leadership. Our 
businessmen "are deficient in the disciplines which nurture sound imagination 
and strong moral character. They do not know the arts of humanitas, which teach 
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a man his true nature and his duties."44 Kirk's criticisms of industrialism, 
combined with his condemnations of the undue cultural and economic influence 
of a relatively small number of businessmen, suggest a sympathy for the kind of 
economic decentralization advocated by Weaver. 
When we recall that the traditionalists were advancing their arguments 
during a particularly inauspicious period for regionalism and decentralization, it 
comes as little surprise that they did not always find a sympathetic ear. The 
decades-long state of emergency that was the Cold War seemed to demand the 
very political and economic centralization that they so detested. As early as 1952, 
in fact, future conservative leader William F. Buckley, Jr., expressly advocated 
the erection of a "totalitarian bureaucracy" at home in order to fight the 
Communist menace abroad.45 Regionalism and particularism of the sort advo-
cated by traditionalists could scarcely be expected to flourish in an ideological 
environment calling for national uniformity and oneness of purpose. Moreover, 
with national prestige and even survival thought to be at stake, their sympathy for 
some kind of economic decentralization would doubtless have been anathema to 
any American leader. 
Ironically, it was on the left that much of what Kirk, Weaver, and Nisbet were 
saying about the importance of community resonated most—in particular, in the 
"participatory democracy" of the New Left and its Port Huron Statement, and in 
the demands of the Black Power movement.46 Both of these developments, of 
course, were short lived. With the Cold War over, these issues have come to the 
fore yet again, both inside and outside the conservative movement. 
A growing number of left-leaning intellectuals and politicians, particularly 
since the early 1980s, have registered what they call a "communitarian" critique 
of liberalism.47 Communitarian symposia reveal a wide variety of perspectives; 
but their broad areas of agreement permit several generalizations. All agree that 
liberalism, with its emphasis on individual rights, fails adequately to take into 
account the human need for community, and indeed undermines the existence of 
those corporate bodies that stand between the individual and the state. They tend 
to look with favor on the republican ideology, with its concern for the common 
good and for broad political participation, that seems to have dominated Ameri-
can thought in the eighteenth century. 
Indeed, much communitarian rhetoric seems to écho traditionalist concerns. 
Thus Amitai Etzioni, in a survey of communitarian literature, writes: 
Indeed, the greatest danger for rights (and liberty more gener-
ally) arises when the social moorings of individuals are sev-
ered. The atomization of individuals, the dissolution of com-
munities into mobs, the loss of attachments and social commit-
ments, cause individuals to lose competence, the capacity to 
reason, and self-identity. This is a societal condition which, it 
has been widely observed, has preceded the rise of totalitarian 
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movements and governments, although it is not necessarily the 
only cause. As Alexis de Tocqueville argued, the best protec-
tion against totalitarianism is a pluralistic society laced with 
communities and voluntary associations, rather than a society 
of highly individualized rights carriers.48 
While much of the rhetoric that emerges from the communitarians is 
relatively innocuous and antiseptic, their specific positions are more controver-
sial. The idea of community that Robert Bellah propounds in Habits of the Heart, 
a landmark communitarian work, calls Americans "to wider and wider circles of 
loyalty ultimately embracing that universal community of all beings"—some-
thing like the opposite of the idea of community that the traditionalists sought to 
vindicate.49 He quotes with strong disapproval the sentiments of Ted Oster, a 
California lawyer, who observes: "I have a big problem with identifying with 
hundreds of millions of whatever—people, flowers, cars, miles. I can see the 
community around me." Bellah has only contempt for what he considers such a 
stunted view of community. "When thinking of the imperative to 'love thy 
neighbor,' " he writes, "many metropolitan Americans like Ted thus consider that 
responsibility fulfilled when they love those compatible neighbors they have 
surrounded themselves with, fellow members of their own lifestyle enclave, 
while letting the rest of the world go its chaotic, mysterious way."50 
The traditionalists, as we have seen, would no doubt have joined Bellah and 
Michael Sandel in deploring the consequences for community life of the introduc-
tion of, say, a Wal-Mart (to choose a favorite example of Sandel's). But when it 
comes to federalism, a principle they considered fundamental to the rejuvenation 
of localities, Sandel, like most communitarians, has very little to say—and the 
remarks he does offer are usually disparaging.51 
Moreover, and on a not unrelated point, many if not most communitarians 
concern themselves less with protecting the integrity and independence of 
communities than with ensuring that the communities themselves observe the 
basic tenets and freedoms of liberalism. Amy Gutmann of Princeton, for 
example, insists that communities honor the principles of "nonrepression" and 
"nondiscrimination." She means by these terms, moreover, to secure not simply 
"negative liberties," but also to vindicate positive rights. The most fundamental 
of these, in her view, is "the entitlement of every child to a nonrepressive 
education." The approach of which Gutmann speaks, which traces its pedigree 
to John Dewey, seeks to educate children in the values of social democracy.52 
For Gutmann, deliberative democracy is sustainable only if its citizens are 
educated in the liberal values that a democracy requires. The traditionalists would 
have had no quarrel with the communitarian call for a diversity of intermediate 
institutions between the individual and the state.53 But Gutmann's claim that 
authentic community necessarily demands an internal pluralism and a diversity 
of ideas and perspectives within these institutions—which, moreover, children 
must be taught to accept as the sign of a healthy body politic—is much more 
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problematic. Traditionalists, in fact, would be prepared to argue the very 
opposite. There can indeed be elements of explicit and implicit coercion in a 
community, particularly when its members see themselves as collectively de-
fending substantial goods—certain moral norms, say, in a small Catholic town— 
and not as simply agreeing to neutral procedural rules within which a variety of 
perspectives may be debated (as in Gutmann's scenario). In the case of children 
and parents, to offer a very specific example, should a school engage in 
pedagogical methods involving deliberation among a variety of political perspec-
tives when parents object on religious grounds to some of those perspectives? 
Gutmann says yes—the community's need to educate future citizens in demo-
cratic modes of thinking and decision-making trumps parental objections.54 The 
traditionalist, with an emphasis on the primacy of the family, must disagree. 
Yet in raising the issue of coercion and illiberalism at the local level, 
communitarians do raise a point that the heirs of Kirk, Weaver, and Nisbet must 
address if they wish to be taken seriously. Indeed, for all their appreciation of the 
importance of intermediary institutions and of the sense of identity that can come 
only from the spontaneous association that occurs in small, organic groups, the 
traditionalists were seldom frank about what might be considered some of the less 
agreeable consequences of decentralization. Of the three men under consider-
ation, Nisbet addressed the problem most directly in his discussion of the civil 
rights movement—which all traditionalists opposed. That there was some justice 
in the claims of blacks Nisbet did not dispute. He insisted, however, that in the 
long run it is better for these issues to be resolved at the local level, by the people 
who live in the communities in question. The central state is all too willing, in the 
name of humanitarianism, to protect the individual from intermediary institu-
tions—and, in the process, to weaken those institutions. Nisbet warns that such 
an approach fails to appreciate that to the extent that these institutions are 
weakened, people are deprived of an important source of protection from abuses 
of power from the center itself.55 
It appeared that the traditionalists were at least partially vindicated in the 
victories of Ronald Reagan in 1980 and the Republicans in 1994; but this was true 
only in a very limited and superficial sense. Reagan's administration was 
dominated by neoconservatives, whose views in a whole host of areas were 
anathema to traditionalists.56 To suppose, moreover, that Kirk, Weaver, and 
Nisbet would have been satisfied with block grants to the states is to fail utterly 
to appreciate the depth and profundity of the traditionalist critique.57 
While the neoconservative philosophy, to the extent that one can be said to 
exist, may well pay rhetorical allegiance to the idea of Burke's "little platoons," 
its exaggerated nationalism trumps any such considerations. William Kristol and 
David Brooks, editors of the neoconservative Weekly Standard, articulated this 
perspective with revealing candor in a recent Wall Street Journal op-ed. Echoing 
the left communitarians, they write: "The revitalization of our local civic life 
depends, ultimately, on our national political health." Kristol and Brooks go on 
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to outline what they call a "national-greatness conservatism," for "America won't 
be good locally if it isn't great nationally."58 
"National-greatness conservatism," they explain, consists of the nationalism 
of Alexander Hamilton, Henry Clay and Teddy Roosevelt—a central part of 
which is a strong executive. Kristol and Brooks are representative, here as 
elsewhere, of neoconservatism in general; support for a vigorous and dynamic 
presidency is a standard neoconservative position.59 Robert Nisbet' s views on the 
danger posed by a strong charismatic figure at the head of any modern state, 
democratic or not, have already been cited. Kirk, for his part, refused to admit 
Alexander Hamilton into the conservative pantheon precisely because of his 
centralizing and imperial designs ; Hamilton had said, moreover, that he hoped the 
central government would "triumph altogether over the state governments and 
reduce them to entire subordination."60 
Neoconservatives, indeed, express guarded support for the welfare state,61 
and enthusiastic support for the civil rights movement.62 Traditionalist misgiv-
ings about the latter have been discussed above; as for the welfare state, the likes 
of Kirk, Weaver, and Nisbet based their opposition on a concern that when the 
central state takes over a task that had previously fallen within the purview of 
localities, churches, and civic groups, these institutions, denuded of their tradi-
tional functions, will atrophy. 
Still more troubling from the traditionalist point of view is the neoconservative 
emphasis on an aggressive American foreign policy. Neoconservatism "em-
braces a neo-Reaganite foreign policy of national strength and moral assertiveness 
abroad," according to Kristol and Brooks. Indeed, the moral imperative of what 
for lack of a better term might be called democratic globalism permeates 
neoconservative foreign-policy commentary. Even before the Cold War had 
ended, Joshua Muravchik spelled out what America's future approach to the 
world should be. "The West knows little about ideological war," he began. "But 
the place to start is with the assertion that democracy is our creed; that we believe 
all human beings are entitled to its blessings; and that we are prepared to do what 
we can to help others achieve it."63 
Robert Nisbet, on the other hand, condemned what he saw as an especially 
unctuous Wilsonian moralism that had characterized American foreign policy 
since World War I. "Where we intervene the act is almost compulsively cloaked, 
even as Wilson's acts were, in rhetoric of pious universalism."64 Coupling 
moralism and foreign policy, the traditionalists were convinced, virtually guar-
anteed ongoing American intervention across the globe, the domestic conse-
quences of which could only be disastrous. They saw in war and in ceaseless 
military intervention not a recipe for national glory but a deadly poison for civil 
society. War not only leads to still more political and economic centralization, 
but it also at least implicitly calls on Americans to transfer their primary 
allegiance from the locality to the central state. As Nisbet put it: 
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For it is difficult to perform the administrative measures 
necessary to political and military centralization without draw-
ing in drastic fashion from the functions, the authorities, and 
the allegiances that normally fall to such institutions as reli-
gion, profession, labor union, school, and local community. 
Quite apart from direct administrative action, the sheer bril-
liance of the fires of war has the effect of making dim all of the 
other lights of culture. The normal incentives of family, 
occupation, education, and recreation—already so weakened 
as the result of processes embedded in modern history— 
become singularly unattractive and irrelevant compared with 
the intoxicating incentives that arise from war and its now 
unlimited psychological demands. Given the quickening 
effects of war on social dislocation and cultural sterilization, it 
is not strange that the State should become, in time of war, the 
major refuge of men.65 
According to Nisbet, war serves to revolutionize society, to undermine the 
very kind of social order that conservatives claimed to support. The traditional, 
kinship-based order that Nisbet pointed to as a source of social and psychological 
stability, with its checks against excessive individualism, its intermediation of 
authority—in household, clan, kindred—and its emphasis on ascribed status over 
achieved status, gave way under the demands of war and military mobilization to 
something resembling modern forms of social organization. The principles of 
military association placed much more emphasis on individualism; honor was 
given not to the oldest or wisest but according to achievement, to the strongest and 
the most skillful, and therefore usually to the young. From ancient Athens to 
China to modern-day Vietnam, Nisbet argued, the pattern was the same. Indeed 
these consequences of war did not escape the notice of the Jacobins or the 
Communists, for whom war served, at least in part, to accelerate the destruction 
of the kind of traditional society that they sought to replace. For these reasons in 
particular, no foreign policy that smacked in any way of a state of constant 
military readiness, of universalism or globalism—what revisionist historian 
Harry Elmer Barnes caustically denounced as "perpetual war for perpetual 
peace"—could earn the assent of an authentic conservative.66 
The end of the Cold War has served to separate those conservatives who had 
supported an anti-Communist foreign policy for reasons of strict security—and 
who under normal conditions would have been "isolationists"—from those 
whose aims were more or less explicitly Wilsonian.67 The Ludwig von Mises 
Institute, for example, a free-market organization founded during the early 
Reagan years, published the proceedings of one of their recent conferences as The 
Costs of War: America's Pyrrhic Victories.6S In attendance at the conference— 
which consisted of interdisciplinary antiwar papers by isolationist conservative 
and libertarian scholars—was presidential candidate Patrick J. Buchanan. 
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Not surprisingly, Buchanan, who has criticized abuses of power by both big 
government and big business, in the process articulating the conservative 
communitarianism of the traditionalists, won the support of Kirk and Nisbet. 
(Richard Weaver died prematurely in 1963.) Also supporting Buchanan were the 
Rockford Institute and its magazine, Chronicles, whose editors and contributors 
favor, if anything, more decentralization and local control than does the conser-
vative commentator himself. While neoconservatism has come to dominate the 
right wing at large,69 its ongoing confrontations with the "paleoconservatism" of 
the pro-Buchanan camp have contributed to a growth in the visibility and 
influence of those foundations who support the controversial candidate. The New 
Republic noted in 1992, for example, that "Chronicles, which was on the 
periphery of conservatism under Reagan, has become suddenly engaged at its 
center as the Bush-Buchanan race looms."70 
The conservative communitarianism of Kirk, Weaver, and Nisbet is there-
fore pregnant with implications for modern America. The spread of taxpayers' 
revolts, Tenth Amendment movements, neo-Confederate activism, and even 
militias and rumblings of secession suggest the continuing urgency of the issues 
of liberty and community. The traditionalist point of view brings to these 
questions a surprisingly fresh, if at times problematic, perspective—and one that 
the communitarian left of Bellah and Sandel or the mainstream right of Kristol 
and the neoconservatives fail to capture. And as it does so, it also serves to remind 
us that the important fissures in the conservative movement today revolve not 
around mere policy disputes or questions of strategy, but around the most 
fundamental questions of human interaction and social existence. 
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